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818 PAC. COAST DAIRY V. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE. [19 C. (2d) 
[8. F. No. 16694. In Bank Mar. 12, 1942.J 
PACIFIC COAST DAIRY, INC. (a Corporation), Peti-
tioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OF 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Respondents. 
[1] Constitutional Law-Police Power-Scope-Extra-territorial 
Effect.-A state may validly regulate activities, persons, and 
property within its jurisdiction, even though extra-territorial 
repercussions ensue, whenever such regulation is vital to the 
welfare of its inhabitants. The propriety of such regulation 
is determined by its focus upon an internal problem, not by 
the range of its influence. 
[2] Food-Milk-Federal Marketing Agreement Act-Interstate 
Commerce: Commerce - Interstate - Shipments to Moffett 
Field.-By the definition of interstate or foreign commerce in 
the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 
§10(j) (7 U. S. C. A. §610 (j», Congress intended to cover 
the broadest possible field that might come within its powers 
to regulate interstate commerce and to govern territories. The 
definition embraces shipments to such areas as Moffett Field, 
where the transit ends. And such shipments come within the 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce within the 
meaning of the commerce clause. 
[3] Id. - Milk - Milk Control Act - Validity. - Althougb the 
state milk control act (Agr. Code, §§ 735-738) has repercus-
sions upon shipments of milk into federal territory within the 
state, since it is focussed upon the state problem the act does 
not run counter to the commerce clause so long as it does not 
conflict with the provisions or objectives of Congressional legis-
lation. 
[4] ld. - Milk - Milk Control Act - Conflict with Federal Pro-
visions.-While the state milk control act (Agr. Code, §§ 735-
738)would yield in case of any conflict with any federal mar-
keting agreement or order with respect to the milk industry 
involved in interstate commerce, in the absence of any regula-
tions by the federal administrative officer there is no conflict 
which affects the application of the state act to the delivery 
of milk to federal territory, such as Moffett Field. 
[5] Id.-Milk-Milk Control Act-Shipments to Federal Instru-
mentalities.-The state milk control act can validly affect 
[2] See 11 Am. Jur. 58. 
McK. Dig; References: [1] Constitutional Law, § 98 (2J Food~ 
§ 1; Commerce, § 2; [3-5J Food, ~ 1. 
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milk sold to instrumentalities of the United States. The act 
regulates not the army, but the distributors who are indepen-
dent contractors with the federal government, and any conse-
quent burden on the government is speculative and remote. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the dismissal of a 
proceeding to revoke the liccnse of a milk distributor. Writ 
denied. 
Vincent W. Hallinan and Carey Van Fleet for Petitioner. 
Frank J. Hennessy, United States Attorney, and William 
E. Licking, Assistant United States Attorney, as Amici 
Curiae, on behalf of Petitioner. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Wm. T. Sweigert, Assistant 
Attorney General, and W. R. Augustine, Deputy Attorney 
General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1935 the California legislature passed 
an act regulating the marketing and distribution of fluid 
milk and fluid cream. (Cal. Agr. Code, Div. 4, ch. 10, secs. 
735-738.) The act declares that it is the policy of the state 
to promote the intelligent production and orderly l:1arketing 
of such essential commodities as milk; that an adequate sup-
ply of wholesome milk is vital to the public health; that the 
production, transportation, processing, storage, distribution, 
and sale of milk and creall1 therefore constitute an industry 
affected with a public interest; and that unfair and destruc-
tive trade practices in the production, marketing, and dis-
tribution of milk and cream have menaced the public health 
by undermining sanitary regulations, which cannot of them-
selves guard against serious deterioration in the supply of 
milk. (Agr. Code, sec. 735.) It sets forth as one of its 
objectives the elimination of "speculation, waste, improper 
marketing, unfair and destructive trade practices, and im-
proper accounting for milk purchased from producers .... " 
The act as amended (Stats. 1937, ch. 3, 413, 710; Stats. 
1941, ch. 1214) empowers the Director of Agriculture to set 
up defined marketing areas within the state, to prescribe 
minimum prices for fluid milk and fluid cream to be paid by 
distributors to producers in accordance with stabilization 
and marketing plans for such areas (secs. 735.4 (b) (4) (5) 
and 736.3 (b) (c», to prescribe minimum wholesale and 
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retail· prices of fluid milk and fluid cream within each area 
(Agr; Code, secs. 736.11, 736.12), to license milk distributors 
within each area, to revoke or suspend licenses for violation 
of any stabilization and marketing plan, and to bring actions 
to enjoin such violations. (Agr. Code, sec. 737.7.) 
The petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the 
Director of Agriculture to dismiss proceedings undertaken 
pursuant to section 737.11 of the Agricultural Code with 
the object of revoking petitioner's license. In these proceed-
ings it is alleged that petitioner violated section 736.3 (a) 
(6) of the code and of the Stabilization and Marketing Plan 
for the Santa Clara Marketing Area by purchasing, proces-
sing, bottling, transporting, and delivering in the Santa Clara 
Marketing Area fluid milk that it sold to the Federal Govern-
ment for less than the minimum wholesale prices prescribed 
for that area. The sale occurred on Moffett Field, territory 
within the geographic boundaries of the Santa Clara .Mar-
kcting Area, but subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal government. 
Since the demand for fluid milk fluctuates from day to 
day and cannot be anticipated exactly, the producers must 
supply enough milk to meet all reasonable needs; then any 
surplus, or "stand by," is converted into milk products and 
sold by the distributors at lower prices, with corresponding 
lower receipts for the producers. The possibility of a surplus 
has been a constant threat to the stability of prices paid to 
the producers, given the reluctance of distributors . to pay 
the flill price for milk that becomes in part converted into 
milk products. A stabilization plan counteracts this down, 
ward pull by establishing minimum prices for fluid· milk. 
At the end of a given period, the distributor settles his 
accounts with the producer by paying him a "blended price" 
representing the price for fluid milk bought less the differ-
'ilnce between that price and the price for the milk converted 
into milk products. Even then the producer does not know 
what the blended price will be until the expiration of the 
period for settling accounts. The minimum price of fluid 
milk, however, represents a fixed element in the blended price 
that affords him at least some protection against speCUlation 
at his expense in the distribution of milk, If· the distributor 
were under no compulsion to pay a minimum price he would 
seek to shift to the producer the risk of speculation in a fluc-
tuating market by paying him the lowest possible price, not 
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only for fluid milk sold to consumers but for milk converted 
into milk products, and there would soon be adverse effects 
on standards of production. 
The same adverse effects would result· if the minimum 
price established by a stabilization plan were not uniformly 
enforced. The act itself anticipates that possibility by speci-
fying that there may be no departures from the minimum 
price even when the milk is sold to the Federal Government 
on territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of that govern-
ment. Section 736.3 (a) provides that any stabilization and 
marketing plan shall prohibit distributors and retail stores 
from· engaging in such unfair practices as: 
" (7) The payment of a lesser price by a distributor to 
any producer for fluid milk or fluid cream which is dis-
tributed to any person, including agencies of the Federal, 
State or local government, located upOn property within the 
geographical limits of any marketing area for less than the 
minimum prices established by the director to be paid by 
distributors to producers for fluid milk or fluid cream for said 
marketing area. 
I I (8) The purchasing or receiving of any fluid milk or 
fluid cream by distributors from producers within a market-
ing area wherein a stabilization and marketing plan is in 
effect for less than the minimum prices established in sUch 
plan, regardless of whether such milk or cream is subse-
quently sold· or distributed within or. without such marketing 
area, or within or without the jurisdiction' of the State of 
California. " . 
The validity of such provisions is clear. (Milk Oontrol 
Boardv. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346 [59 S. Ct. 
528; 83 L. :Ed. 752] ; Alabamav.Kingand Boozer, -- U. S. 
-_. [62 S. Ct. 43, -- L. Ed. --] ; James v. Dravo Con-
traoting 00., 302 U. S. 134 [58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, 114 
A. L. R. 318].) 
In its original form in 1935 the milk control act prescribed 
minimum prices to the producers only. To prescribe such 
prices without also prescribing minimum resale prices is inef-
fectual, however, since the distributors. cannot pay the pro. 
ducers the prescribed prices unless they have some guarantee 
of corresponding returns. Minimum resale prices, moreover, 
must govern all transactions, particularly those of the pro-
ducer who is his own distributor and who is otherwise apt 
to sell to consumers at prices below those at which regular 
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distributors are required to operate. In the light of these 
considerations, Article 2A was added in 1937 to provide for 
minimum wholesale and retail prices. Section 736.11 pro-
vides that in all marketing areas where a stabilization and 
marketing plan is in effect the Director of Agriculture shall 
prescribe minimum wholesale prices at which milk shall be 
sold by distributors to retail stores, and minimum retail prices 
at which fluid milk shall be sold by distributors and retail 
stores to consumers. Section 736.12 provides that in deter-
mining minimum prices for any marketing area the director 
shall make an investigation relative to that area of such fac-
tors as the quantities of fluid milk distributed and normally 
required by consumers, the price to distributors and their 
handling costs, and the available capacity for processing and 
distributing. Section 736.13 prohibits sale by distributors 
at less than the prescribed prices. 
The most real danger to the prescribed minimum lies in 
sales by distributors at lower prices on areas within the ex-
clusivejurisdiction of the federal government, where transac-
tions cannot be regulated by the state. Prescribed minimum 
prices fail of their purpose if they lie in the shadow of cut 
prices. The route of the milk from the producer to the con-
sumer is a continuous one even when it crosses the imaginary 
line that demarcates federal jurisdiction, and the evil effects 
of substandard prices in the federal area course backward 
to play their part in undermining the intelligent production 
and orderly marketing that the state has declared essential 
to the public health. The state has therefore undertaken to 
regulate the milk industry within the bounds of its jurisdic-
tion in such a manner as to obviate the elusive evils that it 
could not directly attack. Section 736.3 (a) (6) of the Agri-
cultural Code provides that any stabilization and marketing 
plan shall prohibit distributors and retail stores from engag-
ing in such unfair practices as, 
"(6) The purchasing, processing, bottling, transporting, 
delivering or otherwise handling in any marketing area of 
any fluid milk or fluid cream which is to be or is sold or oth-
erwise disposed of by such distributor at any place in the 
geographical area within the outer, outside and external 
boundaries or limits of such marketing area, whether such 
place is a part of the marketing area or not, at less than the 
minimum wholesale and minimum retail prices effective in 
such marketing area." 
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The Stabilization and Marketing Plan for the Santa Clara 
Marketing Area contains the provisions outlined by this sec-
tion. These regulations are directed at the milk before it 
can enter the stronghold of an area within the state's boun-
daries but outside its jurisdiction on terms that would men-
ace the entire milk supply. The alleged violation in the 
present case is the purchasing, processing, bottling, trans-
porting, delivering, and other handling of milk within the 
Santa Clara Marketing Area for prospective sale at a point 
outside the jurisdiction of the state at prices less than the 
minimum prescribed for that marketing area. Petitioner 
contends that the state's control over activities within its 
jurisdiction affords it no authority to impose penalties be-
cause of transactions on Moffett Field. This contention pro-
ceeds from the theory that such penalties violate the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, denying to a state the power to restrict 
or control activities, persons, and property beyond its juris-
diction. (Standard Oil Co. of California v. California, 291 
/ U. S. 242 [54 S. Ct. 381, 78 L. Ed. 775] ; Allgeyer v. Louis-
iana, 165 U. S. 578 [17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832]; St. 
Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S. 346 [43 
S .. Ct. 125, 67 L. Ed. 297] ; Compania General de Tabacos 
de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U. S. 87 
[48 S. Ct. 100, 72 L. Ed. 177] ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 
U. S. 397 [50 S. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926].) This conten-
tion, however, confuses the state's control over activities, 
persons, and property within its jurisdiction and the reper-
cussions of that control in areas outside thereof. The ques-
tion is not whether the state can prescribe the minimum 
prices at which milk may be sold on the territory within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (Cf. Consolidated 
Milk Producers v. Parker, this day decided), but. whether 
it 'has power to regulate acts within its jurisdiction even 
though they are followed in direct line of succession by a 
transaction outside its jurisdiction. 
[1] It is established that a state may validly regulate 
activities, persons, and property within its jurisdiction, even 
though extra-territorial repercussions ensue, whenever such 
regulation is vital to the welfare of its inhabitants. The pro-
priety of the regulation is determined by its focus upon an 
internal problem and not by the range of its influence. Thus, in 
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Mirkovitch v. Milnor, 34 Fed. Supp. 409, the court held that 
the state could exercise its police power over boats within 
state waters in a manner that was bound to affect their activ-
ities beyond state borders. Threatened with the depletion 
of its fish supply by the practices of certain· fishermen, Cali-
fornia provided in the Fish and Game Code that no person 
shall use a boat in this state or its waters that delivers to 
any point outside the state fish caught from the boat in the 
waters of the Pacific Ocean within the state or on the high 
seas or elsewhere without authorization of the Fish and Game 
Commission. The court pointed out that the code provision 
related solely to the operation within state waters of fishing 
vessels delivering their catch outside the state, and empha-
\lized that the provision was designed not to regulate fish-
ing operations beyond the state's jurisdiction but to protect 
the state's fisheries from depletion. The realization that the 
plaintiff might be unable to carryon fishing operations be-
,Yond the state's jurisdiction without entering and operating 
his boat within state waters did not deter the court from 
declaring that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's 
police power over acts within its jurisdiction. 
In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53 [60 S. Ct. 758, 84 L. 
Ed. 1074], the United States Supreme Court upheld a Vir-
ginia statute requiring that insurance policies for persons 
or property in Virginia written by companies authorized to 
do business in Virginia be countersigned by a local agent 
receiving a certain percentage of the commission, even though 
insurer and insured are both outside of Virginia when the 
contract of insurance is negotiated. The close relation be-
tween the insurance contracts and the insured persons or 
property, together with the state's interest in protecting 
such persons and property, justified the regulation despite 
its extra-territorial eff·ect. The court stated: "But the ques-
tion is not whether what Virginia has done will restrict appel-
lant's freedom of action outside Virginia by subjecting the 
exercise of such freedom to financial burdens. The mere fact 
that state action may have repercussions beyond state lines 
is of no judicial significance so long as the action is not within 
that domain which the Constitution forbids. . . . Virginia 
has not sought to prohibit the making of contracts beyond 
her borders. She merely claims that her interest in the risks 
which these contracts are designed to prevent warrants the 
kind of control she has here imposed. This legislation is not 
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to be judged by abstracting an isolated contract written in 
New York from the organic whole of the insurance business, 
the effect· of that business on Virginia, and Virginia's regu-
lation of it." (Pages 62, 63.) (See, also, Holmes v Spring-
field Fire & Marine Insur. Co., 311 U. S. 606 [61 S. Ct. 
19,85 L. Ed. 384]; 32 Fed. Supp. 964; National Union Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71 [43 S. Ct. 32, 67 L. Ed. 
136], and Palmetto Fire Ins. 00. v. Oonn., 272 U. S. 295 
[47 S. Ct. 88, 71 L. Ed. 243] ; Brandeis's dissent in New 
York Life Ins. 00. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 377 [38 S. Ct .. 
337, .62 L. Ed. 772]; cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 
270 U. S. 426 [46 S. Ct. 331, 70 L. Ed. 664].) 
Again in the application of state workmen's compensa-
tion laws, it· is established that where the injury occurs in 
one state and the contract of employment is entered into in 
another, the statute of the state with the greater interest in 
the welfare of the injured workman controls. (Alaska Pack-
ers Assn. v.Industrial Ace. Oom. of Oalifornia, 294 U. S. 532 
[55 S. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044] ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. 
v. Industrial Ace. Oom. of Oalifornia, 10 Cal. (2d) 567 [75 
Pac. (2d) 1058].) In the Alaska Packers case the California 
Workmen's Compensation Act was held applicable to an in-
jury sustained in Alaska by a workman who resided in Cali-
fornia and entered into the contract of employment. here. 
The court noted California's interest in the welfare of the 
injured workman, stating: "Obviously the power of a state 
to effect legal consequences is not limited to occurrences 
within the state if it has control over the status which gives 
rise to those consequences." (Page 541.) (See, also, J. O. 
Penney 00. v. Wisconsin Tax Oom., 311 U. S. 435 [61 S. 
Ct. 246, 85 L: Ed. 267, 130 A. L. R. 1229] ; Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 [57 S. Ct. 772, 81 
L. Ed. 1193,112 A. L. R. 293J ; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
312 U. S. 359 [61 S. Ct. 586, 85 L. Ed. 888, 132 A. L. R. 475].) 
The foregoing cases establish that a state may exer-
cise its power over things within its jurisdiction in the knowl-
edge that it will thereby influence things beyond its jurisdic-
tion, and that its influence may be far reaching, so long as 
the external consequences remain incidental to the solution 
of internal problems. Their application to the present case is 
clear. In accomplishing the objectives of the state milk con-
trol act the state is concerned, not with the destination and 
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sale of the milk but with the effect of the price of the milk 
upon the conditions of production. A price below the fixed 
minimum for milk produced in the state endangers those 
established standards for the milk industry that safeg11ard 
the public health, and leads successively to a breakdown of 
the law, price cutting, diminishing returns to the producers. 
inferior standards of milk production and finally injurious 
effects on the public health. The state has regulated the pur-
chasing, processing, bottling, transporting and handling of 
fluid milk within its jurisdiction with the object, not of 
controlling transactions beyond its jurisdiction, but of sta-
bilizing within its jurisdiction the producton of a commodity 
vital to the public health. 
[2] The state milk control act, however clear its validity 
under the due process clause, must be scrutinized further in 
the light of the commerce clause and the Federal Agricul-
tural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (50 U.S. Stats. 
246), held constitutional in United States v. Rock Royal 
Co-op., 307 U. S. 533 [59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446]. The 
federal act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to enter 
into marketing agreements fixing minimum prices to be paid 
producers for milk that is "in the current of interstate or 
foreign commerce" or that "directly burdens, obstructs or 
affects interstate or foreign commerce." (Sec. 8 (c) (1), 
(2), (5), (7), (8), and (18),7 U. S. C. A. sec. 608c.) It de-
fines interstate or foreign commerce as "commerce between 
any State, Territory or possession, or the District of Colum-
bia, and any place outside thereof; or between points within 
the same State, Territory, or possession, or the District of 
Columbia, but through any place outside thereof; or within 
any Territory, or possession, or the District of Columbia. 
For the purpose of this chapter ... a marketing transaction 
in respect to~n agricultural commodity or product thereof 
shall be considered in interstate or foreign commerce if such 
eommodity or product is part of that current of interstate 
or foreign commerce usual in the handling of the commodity 
or product whereby they or either of them, are sent from one 
State to end their transit, after purchase, in another, includ-
ing all cases where purchase or sale is either for shipment 
to another State or for the processing within the State and 
the shipment outside the State of the products so processed. 
. . . As used herein, the word 'State' includes Territory, the 
District of Columbia, possessions of the United States, and 
~----------'--'----------'------------------------
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foreign nations." Sec. 10(j), 7 u. S. C. A. sec. 610(j).) The 
extensiveness of this definition leaves no doubt that Congress 
intended to cover the broadest possible field that might come 
within its powers to regulate interstate commerce and to gov-
ern territories. 
The shipments of milk from California to such areas as 
Moffett Field, where the transit ends, fall within this def-
inition of interstate commerce, for Moffett Field can be clas-
sified as either a territory or possession of the United States 
outside the jurisdiction of California, even though within 
the state's boundaries. 
The contention is nevertheless advanced that transactions 
between such federal areas as Moffett Field and the rest of 
the state do not come within the power of Congress to reg· 
ulate' interstate commerce, because such areas do not fall 
within the categories of states, foreign nations, or Indian 
tribes set forth in the commerce clause. The judicial inter· 
pretation of the commerce clause, however, has greatly ampli. 
fied the meaning of interstate commerce. Thus, commerce 
between states and territories has long been recognized as 
interstate commerce. (Hanley v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 
187 U. S. 617 [23 S. Ct. 214, 47 L. Ed. 333] ; Inter-Island 
Steam Navigation Co. v. Hawaii, 96 Fed. (2d) 412, aff'd 
305 U. S. 306 [59 S. Ct. 202, 83 L. Ed. 189].) Commerce 
between States and the District of Columbia is similarly rec-
ognized as interstate commerce. (Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 
129 U. S. 141 [9 S. Ct. 256, 32 L. Ed. 637] ; Galloway v. 
Bell, 11 Fed. (2d) 558.) Such areas as Moffett Field are in 
the same category as the District of Columbia, for the same 
power of Congress extends over them both. Cu. S. Const., 
Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 
647 [50 S. Ct. 455, 74 L. Ed. 1091J; Fort Leavenworth 
R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 [5 S. Ct. 995, 29 L. Ed. 
264].) In the light of the foregoing cases it is clear that the 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, rein-
forced by its authority over territories and "forts, maga-
zines, arsenals, dockyards and other needed buildings" en-
ables it to regulate commerce between states and such areas 
as Moffett Field. (Compare People v. Standard Oil Co., 218 
Cal. 123 [22 Pac. (2d) 2]; Grayburg Oil Co. v. State [Tex. 
Civ. App.], 286 S. W. 489; Grayburg Oil Co. v. State [Tex . 
Com. App.], 3 S. W. (2d) 427, and McKesson &- Robbins v. 
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Oollins, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 648 [64 Pac. (2d) 469], which 
did not involve any federal statute· regulating such com-
merce.) 
[3] The milk industry in California is dominantly a local 
one. Only a small percentage of the milk produced goes beyond 
the jurisdiction of the state, but whatever the destination 
of the milk, the state is vitally concerned with thestabiliza· 
tion of the industry, and particularly with standards of pro-
duction, in the state as a whole. The federal territory within 
the state is so fragmented that there may be several fed" 
eral islands within a single marketing area. If they are cita-
dels of immunity from state jurisdiction, they ate also excep-
tional segments in areas that are otherwise subject to that 
jurisdiction. They stand out like colored pins on the map 
of California, and range from military reservations to. sol-
diers' homes, from court houses to penitentiaries, from post 
offices to Indian reservations,frgm national parks to regional 
dams. (See cases cited in 38 Columbo L. Rev. 128, at 130.) 
The commerce between them and the rest of the state is of 
the greatest interest to the state regardless of the circum-
stance that it may be regulated by the federal government. 
Focussed as it is upon a state problem, the state act, despite 
its repercussions upon interstate commerce, does not run 
counter to the commerce clause so long as it does not con-
flict with the provisions or objectives of Congressional legis-
lation. (Milk Oontrol Board V. Eisenberg Farm Produots, 
306 U. S. 346 [59 S. Ct. 528, 83 L. Ed. 752] ; Duokworth V. 
A.rkansas, -- U. S. _.- [62 S. Ct. 311, -_. L.Ed. -]; 
Oalifornia V. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 [61 S. Ct. 930, 85 
L. Ed. 1219] ; South Oarolina State Highway Dept. 'v. Barn-
well Bros., 303 U. S. 177 [58 So Ct. 510, 82.L. Ed. 734]. See 
27 Cal. L. Rev. 615.) 
[4] The objectives of the federal act in fixing the minimum 
price payable by the distributor to the producer are the same 
as those (}f the California act, namely, to insure to the pro-
ducer a reasonable return on his products (secs. land 2), 
and to the consumer a "sufficient quantity of pure and 
Wholesome milk." (Sec. 8 (c) (18) .) There is no federal 
marketing agreement or order with respect to the milk in-
dustry, however, now· in effect in this state. Where a con-
flict is apparent the state legislation must yield. (United 
States V. Wrightwood Dairy 00., -- U. S. -- [62 S. 
Ct. 523, -- L. Ed. --]; OLoverLeaf Butter Co. v. Patter-
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son, - U. S. - [62 S. Ct. 491, - L. Ed. _].) 
There is a question, however, whether any conflict exists when 
a federal administrative officer is· empowered to prescribe 
regulati(}ns in a field already regulated by a state but does 
not actually do so. The United States Supreme Court has 
held in some cases that a conflict of authority is inherent in 
such a situation by interpreting the failure of the federal 
officer to make any regulation as in effect a ruling that neither 
federal nor state regulation is necessary. (Oregon-Washing-
ton R. & N. 00. V. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 [46 S. Ct. 279, 
70 L. Ed. 482] ; Napier V. A.tlantio Ooast Line Ry. 00., 272 
U. S. 605 [47 S. Ct. 207, 71 L."Ed. 432].) There is a grow-
ing tendency on the part of the court, however, to empha-
size the evils arising from the absence of any regulation, and 
to hold therefore that the existence of an unexercised supe-
rior federal authority does not rule out state regulation vital 
to the public welfare. This realistic view germinated in cases 
upholding state regulation of certain public utility practices 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission did not regulate 
although it had authority to do so. (Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone 00. V. Nebraska State Ry. Oommission, 297 U. S. 471 
[56 S. Ct. 536, 80 L: Ed; 810] ; Missouri Pacifio Ry; 00. V. 
Larabee FldUr Mills 00., 211 U. S. 612 [29 S. Ct. 214, 53 
L. Ed. 352].) The court haS balanced, not the state regu-
lation against the unexercised federal authority, but the im-
portance of the state's objectives against the effects of its 
regulation on interstate commerce. It has rejected tlie theory 
that the failure of a federal administrative agency to exer-
cise its authority necessarily amounts to a: declaration against 
all regulation. Indeed, in H. P. Welsh 00. V. New Hamp-
shire, 306 U; S. 79 [59 S. Ct. 438, 83 L. Ed; 500], it dem~ 
onstrated its concern with keeping the state regulation alive 
in theabselllre of immediate conflict with federal regulation. 
It upheld in that case the application of a state act regu-
lating the hours of drivers of motor carriers to a driver trans-
porting an interstate shipment, even though the Interstate 
Commerce C(}mmission had OVerlapping authority and had 
issued regulations that would conflict with the state act 
when they became effective two years later. The court took 
the view that the safety of the people shou.ld not wait Upon 
federal administrative action. (See, also, Kelly v. Washing-
ton, .302 U. S. 1 [58 S. Ct. 87, 82 L. Ed. 3]; South Oaro-
830 PAC. COAST DAIRY v. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE. [19 C. (~a) 
lina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra; Eich-
holz v. Public Servo Commission, 306 U. S. 268 [59 S. Ct. 
532, 83 L. Ed. 641]; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 
[60 S. Ct. 726, 84 L. Ed. 969] ; Mintz V. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 
346 [53 S. Ct. 611, 77 L. Ed. 1245].) 
Public health, like public safety, is a vital concern of the 
state, and its maintenance at proper levels should likewise 
not wait upon federal regulation. Toward that maintenance 
the California milk control act contributes largely, but it 
might well be disrupted if those engaged in interstate com-
merce escaped the state regulation while they were untouched 
by corresponding federal regulation. The absence of fed-
eral regulation may well be a recognition not only of the 
propriety but of the effectiveness of state regulation in the 
stabilization of a dominant1y local industry, rather than a 
ruling that there should be no regulation. 
[5] There remains the question whether the milk con-
trol act can validly affect milk sold to instrumentalities of 
the United States. In a brief filed as amicus curiae on behalf 
of the United States, the United States Attorney contends 
that the application of the state act to such milk would un· 
duly burden the operation of an essential federal agency, and 
that it is inconsistent with the federal statutes requiring that 
army supplies be secured through competitive bidding. (41 
U. S. C., sec. 5; 10 U. S. C., secs. 1200-1201.) Federal agen-
cies, however, cannot entirely escape the effects of state legis-
lation. The California milk control act does not discrim-
inate against the United States army nor substantially hinder 
its efficient operation. The army is not precluded from ob-
taining milk, nor required to pay more for such milk than, 
other consumers in the same area. The act regulates not the 
army but the distributors who are independent contractors 
with the federal government. It is settled that such contrac-
tors are subject to state control, and that any consequent 
burden on the Federal Government is speculative and remote. 
(Milk Control Board v. Gosselin's Dairy, Inc., 301 Mass. 
174 [16 N. E. (2d) 641]; Paterson Milk &7 Cream Co., Inc. V. 
Milk Control Board, 118 N. J. L. 383 [192 Atl. 838] ; Ala-
bama v. King db Boozer, -- U. S. -- [62 S. Ct. 43, 
-- L. Ed. --]; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 
U. S. 134 [58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155, 114 A. L. R. 318J; 
Atkinson v. State Tax Com. of Oregon, 303 U. S. 20 [58 
S. Ct. 419, 82 L., Ed. 621]; State Tax Com. V. Van Cott, 
Mar. 1942.] LAISNE v. CAL. ST. Bn. OF OPTOMETRY. 831 
306 U. S. 511 [59 S. Ct. 605, 83 L. Ed. 950] ; Helvering V. 
Gerhardt, 304 U. S.405 [58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427]; 
Trinity Farm Const. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 [54 S. 
Ct. 469, 78 L. Ed. 918] ; see 27 Cal. L. Rev. 327.) The very 
federal statutes requiring competitive bidding except cases 
"where it is impracticable to secure competition" (10 U. 
S. C. sec. 1201), and Regulation 5-240 (g) of the United 
States Army provides that it is impracticable to secure such 
competition: "(3) When the price is fixed by Federal, State, 
municipal, or other competent authority." (Penn Dairies, 
Inc. V. Milk Control Commission, (March 25, 1941) Court of 
Common Pleas of Lancaster County,Pennsylvania; Common-
wealth v. Rohrer (Pa.), 37 D. & C. 410.) 
The alternative writ of mandamus is discharged and the 
petition for a peremptory writ is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, 
J., and Carter, J.,concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17578. In Bank. Mar. 16, 1942.] 
E. W. LAISNE, Appellant, V. THE CALIFORNIA STATE 
BOARD OF OPTOMETRY et al., Respondents. 
[la, 1b] Physicians-Licenses-Suspension and Revocation-Re-
view-Trial De Novo.-In a mandamus proceeding questioning 
an order of the State Board of Optometry revoking a certifi-
cate of registration, the court must exercise an independent 
judgment on the facts and receive any material evidence, re-o 
gardless of the proceeding before the board. There must be 
a trial de novo. If the rule were otherwise, there would be 
an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. 
[2] Constitutional Law-Distribution of Powers-Judicial Powers 
on Boards.-If some agency with state-wide jurisdiction, other 
than the Supreme Court, the District Courts of Appeal, and 
[1] See 5 Cal. JUl'. 683; 11 Am. JUl'. 909. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Physicians, § 30; [2, 5] Constitu, 
tional Law, § 82; [3] Constitutional Law, § 74; [4] Physicians, 
§ 2; [6] Administrative Law. 
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